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A Reply: Imperfect Bargains, Imperfect Trials,
and Innocent Defendants
Robert E. Scottt and William J. Stuntztt

To understand what is and is not wrong with plea bargaining, one must
understand the relationship of bargains to trials. Unsurprisingly, we disagree
with much of what Judge Frank Easterbrook and Professor Stephen Schulhofer
say about that relationship.1 Most of those disagreements need not be rehearsed
here; readers attentive enough to wade through their essays and ours will pick
up the key points readily enough. But there is one point where the dispute is
at once sharp and hidden. It has to do with the fact that both trials and bargains
are flawed.
That fact might seem obvious, but the literature on this subject persistently
manages to ignore it. And while there are many good insights in Easterbrook's
and Schulhofer's comments, we think they both fall prey to the tendency to
imagine perfection in one part of the system or the other. That tendency
inevitably leads to one of two conclusions-plea bargaining is just fine the way
it is, or it ought to be junked. These are, of course, the conclusions that Easterbrook and Schulhofer reach; indeed, they are the conclusions that nearly all
scholarship on plea bargaining reaches. Notwithstanding their popularity, we
think both polar positions are wrong.
Consider first the bargaining process. Easterbrook argues that bargains are
better than trials-that plea bargaining efficiently allocates punishment even
if (as he believes) the trial process is riddled with deception and governed by
uninformed and sloppy decisionmaking. 2 If Easterbrook is right, we should
dispense with trials, and let prosecutors decide whom to send to jail and for
how long. But bargains are not better than trials, for a reason common to all
contracts: no system of consensual allocation is better than the dispute resolution process (legal and extralegal) that backs it up. If courts deciding contract
disputes persistently (but randomly) got the parties' intentions wrong, the parties
could not simply be trusted to solve the problem on their own, for they must
contract in the shadow of the enforcement regime. So too here: prosecutors and
t Dean and Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Professor of Law, University of Virginia.
tt E. James Kelly, Jr. Research Professor of Law, University of Virginia.
1. Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargainingas Compromise, 101 YALE L. 1969 (1992); Stephen J.
Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.L 1979 (1992).
2. Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 1970-72.

2011

2012

The Yale Law Journal

[V'ol. 101: 2011

defendants bargain against the backdrop of the trial process that will decide
their dispute if bargaining breaks down. If the trial process is flawed-if trials
sometimes convict innocent defendants-bargaining will not fix the mistakes.
That much is hardly damning, but plea bargaining has deeper flaws.
Prosecutors, like insurers, are charged with finding the occasional deserving
claim in a sea of frauds. Claims granted too easily only encourage more frauds.
And too readily accepting3 a defendant's claim of self-defense, or lack of
intent, or mistaken identity--even when the claim has some ambiguous evidence to back it up 4 -only encourages copycat behavior by guilty defendants
and their lawyers.5 Indeed, defense lawyers are in almost the same position:
they must assume innocence claims by their clients are false unless proved,
because such claims usually are false-criminal defendants, unlike clients in
almost all other settings, have essentially nothing to lose by making false
claims. This dynamic is not a problem in cases where bargaining takes place
after investigation and evidence-gathering are complete, for then the parties can
sift claims in precisely the manner that Easterbrook suggests. But bargaining
usually happens earlier, often much earlier, when only the bare outline of the
case is known to either side.6
Thus, prosecutors can be expected to make offers that fail to internalize
relevant information that suggests defendants' innocence. Easterbrook, along
with some segments of the economics literature on the subject, contends that
this is no problem, since innocent defendants will then find it in their interest
to go to trial. 7 But that happy ending will materialize only if innocent defendants have the same risk preferences as guilty ones. If, as is more likely,
innocent defendants as a class are significantly more risk averse than guilty
defendants as a class, a prosecutor's failure to internalize a defendant's private
information will cost the prosecutor nothing because the defendant, even if
innocent, will take the deal anyway. This may not be earth-shattering, but
neither is it a "barely perceptible theoretical ripple." Rather, the pooling
problem we have identified goes to the core function of the process: its ability
to separate the innocent from the guilty.
To be sure, this analysis assumes that innocent defendants risk conviction
if their cases go to trial. If that assumption is wrong-if innocent defendants
3. "Accepting" the defendant's claim means not only taking it as truthful, but also taking it as possibly
truthful, and hence deserving of some discount in the plea bargain.
4. The problem is not either-or, it applies to defendants whose claims of innocence are partially
corroborated. See Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargainingas Contract, 101 YALE U. 1909,
1936-37 (1992).
5. The idea that criminal false statements statutes deter such conduct, see Easterbrook, supra note I,
at 1971, seems to us wildly implausible.
6. This is also our answer to Schulhofer's explanation, see Schulhofer, supra note 1, at 1982-83, of
why the pooling phenomenon is nonexistent
7. See Easterbrook, supranote 1, at 1969-70; see also Gene M. Grossman & Michael L. Katz, Plea
Bargainingand Social Welfare, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 749, 753-55 (1983).
8. The two commentators unite on this phrase. Easterbrook, supra note I, at 1969; Schulhofer, supra
note 1, at 1981.
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never lose at trial-plea bargaining is a perfect separation device because any
rational innocent defendant will refuse all plea offers, go to trial, and win.'
Sadly, no one familiar with the process can accept this optimistic picture.
Innocent defendants sometimes lose; the fact that the jury convicts means that
guilt is very likely, but neither juries nor judges are perfect. Mistakes, tragic
ones, happen.
This is where we part company with Schulhofer. He attacks our analysis
because we want innocent defendants to be able to plead, if they so choose,
under the best possible terms. In Schulhofer's view, they are better off going
to trial, whether they think so or not. 10 But he is right only if going to trial
means winning at trial. For some it does. For others it means not just loss but
disaster, given the substantially longer sentence that awaits a defendant who
gambles on the trial process and loses. The choice is not between innocent
defendants pleading guilty and the same defendants winning acquittals at
trial-again, if trials are perfect, innocent defendants will not plead, and the
problem disappears altogether. Rather, the choice is between permitting innocents to plead under the most favorable circumstances possible and forcing
them to trial, where they risk vastly greater punishment.
Of course, any system that pushes innocent defendants to trial will thereby
minimize the number of innocents who are convicted. But it will do so only
at the cost of maximizing the amount of punishment each of those unfortunates
receives. This result stands every known theory of distributional justice on its
head. We would think it common ground that losses, especially unjust losses,
are better spread than concentrated, all else being equal. Schulhofer, like most
critics of plea bargaining, seems to prefer a few innocent defendants serving
long prison terms to a larger number serving a few years apiece."
Abolishing plea bargaining altogether might spread the loss a bit by forcing
more (and more casual) trials. But the loss would still be more concentrated,
and hence more substantial, than in the current regime. At least that is so
unless, magically, a trial system that spends much less money per case (in order
to accommodate many more cases) would do a better job than the current
system of sifting the innocent from the guilty. Schulhofer hints at this possibility: he explicitly states that the error rate of scaled-down trials would be no
worse,1 2 and argues that since prosecutors would screen cases better (which
would occur only if trial error rates dropped), the overall effect would be

9. Grossman & Katz, supra note 7, at 753-55, offer a formal proof of this proposition.
10. Of course, as we explain in our article, risk-averse innocent defendants will often plead guilty even

when the terms are unfavorable. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 4, at 1948. Thus, our goal is not to push them
toward pleas rather than trials (as Schulhofer suggests), but to make the terms of their pleas marginally
better.

11. Hence his insistent use of the number of convictions of innocent defendants as the relevant
benchmark; he criticizes us for seeming to want more such convictions. Schulhofer, supra note 1, at 1983-

87.
12. Id. at 2006.
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better.13 Our response is simple: if the system can both save money and
increase accuracy in the trial process, it should do so, regardless of what
choices are made about plea bargaining. But we should not compare apples and
oranges. The only fair evaluation of plea bargaining is one that holds both
resources 14 and decisionmakers' wisdom constant. If trials make mistakes now,
a cheaper trial process would likely make more of them. The combination of
a higher error rate and lower cost per trial would substantially reduce the cost
to a prosecutor of getting a case wrong, just as it would raise the risk of losing
clear cases. That adds up to a reduced incentive to separate the innocent from
the guilty. Meanwhile, the gap between justice for the poor and the rich would
widen because bad lawyers-the kind who represent poor defendants-would
have a greater opportunity to injure their clients.
In short, we inhabit a world where bargaining is imperfect, trials are
imperfect, and resources are limited. The hard but important task for legal
doctrine is how to manage the necessary tradeoffs. While there are some
important reforms that could substantially improve the picture-both Easterbrook and Schulhofer, for example, recommend better financing of defense
counsel, a proposal we endorse-those reforms have long been obvious, if
politically unattractive. Moreover, they tend not to have any particular bearing
on plea bargaining: we would support better funding of defense counsel even
if plea bargaining were abolished. The legal reforms that do bear on plea
bargaining, changes that would make the system function more efficiently and
would help reduce some of its biases against innocent defendants, are marginal.
We think they are nevertheless useful. If habitual criminal laws were abolished,
prosecutors' sentencing promises were enforced, and judges were encouraged
to carefully scrutinize "above-market" plea agreements 5 (the three changes
we suggest in our article), defendants as a whole would be a little better off,
and a disproportionate amount of the gain would go to innocents. There may
be other, more far-reaching possibilities; our list was meant to be suggestive
rather than exhaustive. But we believe the task of academics in this area is to
get on with the business of finding them, and to abandon the all-or-nothing
debate that has so preoccupied us all.

13. See id. at 2007-08.
14. It will not do to say, as Schulhofer does, that things would be better if we both abolished plea
bargaining and spent more on the system as a whole. See id. at 2004-05. It would also function better if
we kept plea bargaining and spent more on the system as a whole.
15. Both Easterbrook and Schulhofer state that this is currently the law. They are of course right that
judges in virtually all jurisdictions are free to award sentences lower than those to which the parties have

agreed. But we meant to suggest more than that. The current system in no way encourages judges to revise

sentences downward, and our own anecdotal evidence suggests that revisions upward are much more
common. We would institute a regime that called for close scrutiny of any plea agreement that involved
a higher-than-normal sentence for the crime in question. Such a regime does not presently exist.
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One should not lose sight of the forest for the trees. Plea bargaining is, for
the most part, efficient and fair.16 Though we raise an important problem in
the bargaining dynamic, it is a problem that does not affect the mass of cases,
and does not even affect all cases where the defendant is innocent. In most
cases, we think the basic soundness of the bargaining regime is clear. And even
in the cases that are affected by the pooling phenomenon, bargaining is probably better than the alternatives. The task for the system is thus a modest one:
to better achieve the parties' desires at acceptable cost. This has long been the
central task of contract law. Our goal is to suggest a marriage of the two. It
seems to us long overdue.

16. Which is not to say that it conforms to the model ofperfectly informed contracting, with the parties
perfectly internalizing all costs and benefits. No contracts conform to that model. That is why we think
Schulhofer's externalities argument is, while interesting, ultimately unavailing. See Schulhofer, supranote
1, at 1987-91. By the standards he applies to plea bargains, we think almost all civil settlements, and a good
many run-of-the-mill deals, would fail. The goal in our article was to try to apply roughly the same standards
to plea bargains that our system applies to other bargains. We continue to believe plea bargaining easily
meets those standards.

